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NORMAL FOR WHOM?
GENDER ACCULTURATION IN
NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES
Gender is so basic to our cultural coding that people often
have difficulty accepting that women are not innately more
timid or men more brazen. Gender is difficult to see while look-
ing at only one's own culture; through comparative inquiry,
however, gender reveals itself to be a social construct.
When Europeans came to North America they found a popu-
lation with completely different traditions and religious beliefs
from their own. Among the differences were vastly disparate
conceptions of gender and sexuality. European's social treat-
ment of gender and sexuality is rooted in the Judeo-Christian
tradition; Native American cultures grounded their social opin-
ions of gender and sexuality in their own religious teachings.
Yet, today, when Native American communities confront issues
of gender and sexuality in the context of gay marriage, tribal
leaders respond like Christian Europeans. Is this just benign ac-
culturation implemented through assimilation of the aboriginal
population into western European, Judeo-Christian culture, or is
it more specific and purposeful?
Part I of this comment chronicles the events following Dawn
McKinley and Kathy Reynolds' filing of a marriage application
with their tribe in 2004. The tribal leadership's response shows
the animosity towards same-sex couples present in the Chero-
kee Nation of Oklahoma of today. Part II provides a brief sum-
mary of the gender systems that existed in the aboriginal
cultures of North America prior to European settlement, dem-
onstrating how different these traditions were from the Judeo-
Christian belief system. Part III discusses some of the major in-
teractions between the federal government & tribes, particularly
as those interactions demonstrate the federal government's po-
lemic relationship with Native Americans' cultural heritage.
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Part IV concludes that federal actions contributed to the divide
between the current and past cultural conditions in tribal
culture.
INTRODUCTION: TODAY'S NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES
In May of 2004, a Cherokee couple, Dawn McKinley and
Kathy Reynolds, went to the tribal clerk's office and picked up a
marriage application, tipping off a flurry of activity in every
branch of tribal governance, and a court battle that is still un-
resolved.' This part first looks at the legal actions taken in re-
sponse to the women's marriage. Second, this part looks at
tribal leaders' statements about the marriage, revealing their im-
pressions of the meaning of marriage in their tribes.
A. Legal Actions in Response to Same-Sex Marriage
McKinley and Reynolds have faced a series of negative re-
sponses from the tribal government and influential tribe mem-
bers since they picked up their marriage application. On May
14, 2004, one day after they received their marriage application,
Chief Justice Darrell Dowty of the tribe's highest court, the Ju-
dicial Appeals Tribunal ("JAT"),2 issued a thirty-day morato-
rium prohibiting the issuance of any further marriage
1 Sheila Stogsdill & Judy Gibbs Robinson, Cherokees Working to Ban Gay
Vows: Lesbian Couple Obtain Tribal Marriage Application, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, May 16, 2004, at 1A (discussing marriage application and ini-
tial judicial moratorium and legislative actions). See also S.E. Ruckman,
Third Challenge Filed to Tribal Same-Sex Marriage, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 4,
2006, at A12 (announcing initiation of third lawsuit); Case Docket: Reynolds
& McKinley, NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, [hereinafter "NCLR
Docket"], http://www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=issue
caseDocketreynolds (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
2 The Judicial Appeals Tribunal is the tribe's highest court of appeals. See
CHEROKEE NATION JUDICIAL BRANCH, www.cherokeecourts.org (last visited
Feb. 26, 2012). The Court was renamed by tribal constitutional amendment
in 1999 to the "Supreme Court." History of the Supreme Court, CHEROKEE
NATION JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.cherokeecourts.org/History/History-
oftheSupremeCourt.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). News articles and docu-
ments refer to the court as the "Judicial Appeals Tribunal" until sometime
after 2006. This article follows that nomenclature.
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applications to same-sex couples. 3 Principal Chief Chad Smith
also "asked tribal lawyers to look into the tribe's marriage
policy."4
On June 14, 2004, one month after the women obtained their
marriage application, the Cherokee Nation's Tribal Council
unanimously passed a law permanently banning any other same-
sex couples from obtaining a tribal marriage application.5 Since
Reynolds and McKinley already had their marriage application,
the amendment passed by the Tribal Council would not prevent
the couple from filing their marriage application. 6 Yet they
might not be legally married until they file their marriage appli-
cation,7 a feat that they have been continuously prevented from
achieving.8 Initially, the Chief Justice's thirty-day moratorium
prevented the women from being able to file their marriage ap-
plication.9 Since the moratorium expired, lawsuits have pre-
vented the couple from filing their marriage application because
it cannot be filed while a lawsuit contesting the marriage is
pending.1o
Lawsuits contesting the marriage have been pending almost
continuously since the women obtained their marriage applica-
tion. The first two suits were both dismissed for lack of stand-
ing, but the third is still pending as of this comment's
publication." This sub-part looks at the circumstances sur-
rounding each of the lawsuits in turn.
3 Stogsdill, supra note 1, at 1A; Sheila K. Stogsdill, Cherokees Extend Mar-
riage Restriction, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June 19, 2004, at 9A, 14A; S. E. Ruck-
man, Tribe Nixes Bids for Same-Sex Marriages, TULSA WORLD, May 18,
2004, at A9.
4 Stogsdill, supra note 1, at 1A.
5 Stogsdill, supra note 3, at 9A.
6 Id.
7 Stogsdill, supra note 1, at 1A; see also 25 CFR § 11.600(b)(1) (2010) (seem-
ingly requiring all of application, ceremony, and recording for valid tribal
marriage).
8 Stogsdill, supra note 3, at 14A.
9 Kelly Kurt, Tribal Court to Consider Marriage: Lesbian Couple Seek Rec-
ognition of their Union, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 19, 2005, at 14A.
10 See Ruckman, supra note 1, at A12.
11 NCLR Docket, supra note 1.
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On June 11, 2004, less than one month after the women's mar-
riage, Todd Hembree, in his individual capacity, filed a lawsuit
requesting an injunction against the marriage of McKinley and
Reynolds.12 Because the Tribal Council amended the tribe's
marriage law around the same time that Hembree filed suit, it
became clear that his suit would affect only McKinley and
Reynolds.' 3 Regardless, Hembree maintained the suit, explain-
ing "I just don't want the validity of Cherokee law to be in ques-
tion or made a mockery of."1 4 The couple's first wedding
anniversary came and went while they were still embroiled in
defending against Hembree's lawsuit, still unable to officially
file their marriage application.15
On August 3, 2005, the JAT's three-justice panel dismissed
Hembree's lawsuit for lack of standing. 16 The JAT held that
Hembree failed to show that he would individually be harmed if
the women were allowed to file their marriage application.17 In
response to the dismissal, Hembree told the press that he still
believed that same-sex marriage violated the Cherokee Nation's
constitution, and he hoped that the Cherokee Nation would
intervene.18
Two days later, on August 5, 2005, a group of tribal councilors
filed their own lawsuit, using the same arguments Hembree had
advanced, trying to block McKinley and Reynolds from record-
ing their marriage.19 This time, Hembree represented the group
of nine tribal councilors.20 The six other council members de-
12 Stogsdill, supra note 3, at 14A.
13 See id.
14 Kurt, supra note 9, at 14A.
15 Id.
16 Sheila K. Stogsdill, Tribes: Cherokee Attorney Loses: Court Dismisses
Lawsuit Over Women's Marriage, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 4, 2005, at 11A.
17 Id. See also Tahlequah-Same-Sex Marriage is Opposed, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 10, 2005, at 11A.
18 See Stogsdill, supra note 16, at 11A.
19 Tahlequah-Same-Sex Marriage is Opposed, supra note 17, at 11A.
20 Cherokee High Court Rules in Favor of NCLR and Same Sex Couple (Jan.
4, 2006), NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, [hereinafter NCLR Press
Release 2006], http://www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=issue
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clined to participate.21 The nine council members claimed to
have standing to file the petition in their official capacity; the
JAT did not agree.22 On December 22, 2005, the JAT dismissed
the council-member's lawsuit for the same standing defect that
caused Hembree's lawsuit to fail23-namely, that the tribal
councilors failed to show that they would be personally harmed
by the marriage's recognition.24
Early in 2006, less than a month after the council members'
suit was dismissed, the Cherokee Nation's court administrator (a
position similar to a county clerk), filed a third lawsuit.25 This
time, it was a petition for a declaratory judgment, asking the
JAT to relieve the administrator of responsibility for filing the
women's marriage certificate in case they again tried to have it
officially recorded. 26 Her official duties include filing marriage
applications in compliance with tribal law.27 The court adminis-
trator's attorney explained that they hoped this official duty
would get her case past the standing issue.28 Her position was
that, even before the Tribal Council clarified its marriage statute
in 2004, the law had not intended to recognize same-sex mar-
riages.29 Thus, she believed that filing the application would be
a violation of tribal law. The tribal administrator's suit is still
pending as of January 2012,30 seven years after McKinley and
Reynolds picked up their marriage application from the court
clerk with little fanfare. Currently, the lawsuit seems destined
to remain abandoned on the tribal docket, which will continu-
ously prevent McKinley and Reynolds from filing their marriage
application.
caseDocketreynolds (follow "Read NCLR's press release 01.04.06"
hyperlink).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Ruckman, supra note 1, at A12.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See id.
28 Id
29 Id.
30 NCLR Docket, supra note 1.
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B. Leaders' Statements in Response to Same-Sex Marriage
While the couple's marriage has been in legal limbo within the
Cherokee Nation, neighboring tribes have also reconsidered
their own marriage laws.31 Nearby, Creek Nation's and Iowa
Tribe's laws already specifically excluded same-sex marriages
from tribal recognition.32 A few other tribes acknowledged that
their laws made no mention of same-sex marriage at all.33 The
Muscogee Nation, for example, had no official stance on same-
sex marriage in 2004.34 The Navajo Nation passed legislation
that would have banned same-sex marriage on its reservation
but the Navajo Nation's president vetoed the provision.35
While the tribes reacted differently, tribal leaders in
Oklahoma overwhelmingly seemed to agree that same-sex mar-
riage had no place in tribal culture or tribal courts.36 For exam-
ple, one tribal leader, who served at various times as a Supreme
Court Justice for two different tribes and as general counsel for
three other tribes, told Tulsa reporters, "I think the events of the
non-Indian world are bringing [same-sex marriage] to the fore-
front."37 He expressed "doubts that same-sex marriage had ever
been an issue among any of the five tribes he serves."38 Hem-
bree, at the time that he filed the first lawsuit, told reporters that
no other tribes allowed same-sex marriages either.39 The Chero-
31 Sheila K. Stogsdill & Tony Thornton, Tribes Mull Their Laws on Mar-
riage, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 18, 2004, at 3A.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Ruckman, supra note 3, at A9.
35 Kurt, supra note 9, at 14A (The legal debate is moot for some tribes be-
cause many of the thirty-eight federally-recognized tribes in Oklahoma such
as the Choctow Nation do not issue marriage licenses at all.); Stogsdill, supra
note 31, at 3A. See also Ruckman, supra note 3, at A9.
36 See David Zizzo, Marriage Could, Force High Court Decision, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, June 27, 2004, at 7A; Stogsdill, supra note 31, at 3A; Stogsdill,
supra note 1, at 1A.
37 Stogsdill, supra note 31, at 3A.
38 Stogsdill, supra note 1, at 1A.
39 Id.
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kee Chief also expressed his belief that Cherokee tradition
never recognized gay marriage.40
A Native American Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, and Transgender
("LGBT") organization, however, lauded the dismissal of Hem-
bree's case specifically because the dismissal honored tribal tra-
dition: "[t]his decision speaks to the primacy of native
sovereignty and traditions that demonstrate acceptance and dig-
nity of all human beings and our spiritual traditions." 4 1 Those
spiritual traditions include the "two-spirited" tradition, which
recognized that "[a] person who was homosexual was consid-
ered to have both male and female spirits."42 David Cornsilk, a
Cherokee journalist, described same-sex relations as "simply a
natural part of 'everyday ' life" in the traditional cultures of the
Cherokee, and other tribes.43
Brian Gilley, an anthropology professor of Cherokee descent,
submitted an amicus curiae brief to the JAT explaining "there is
overwhelming evidence for the historic and cultural presence of
multiple gender roles and same-sex relations among most if not
all Native North Americans, including the Cherokee, and that
they historically shared in the institution of marriage."44 Con-
trary to the beliefs of Todd Hembree and the mainstream tribal
leaders, the anthropological tradition to which Gilley refers is
well documented in many tribes.
II. TRADITIONAL NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES
In 1940, anthropologist Alfred Kroeber noted that "[i]n most
of primitive northern Asia and North America, men of homo-
sexual trends adopted women's dress, work, and status, and
were accepted as non-physiological but institutionalized
women." 45 The anatomically-female, male-identified individuals
40 Zizzo, supra note 36, at 7A.
41 Richard LaFortune, quoted in NCLR Press Release 2006, supra note 20.
42 Zizzo, supra note 36, at 7A.
43 Id.
44 NCLR Press Release 2006, supra note 20.
45 A.L. KROEBER, Psychosis or Social Sanction, in THE NATURE OF CUL-
TURE 310, 313 (1952) (originally published by the author in 1940, reprinted in
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are called "Hwame," and anatomically-male, female-identified
individuals are "Alyha."4 6
This part looks at the gender system in native North America.
Part II.A addresses some preliminary concerns with differences
between and among tribes and bias in the primary sources. Part
II.B highlights some of the foundational differences between the
European and North American conceptions of gender-apart
from the Alyha and Hwame traditions. Part II.C discusses how
the foundational differences affect other aspects of the culture.
Part II.D looks specifically at the Native American Alyha and
Hwame traditions, and how they fit within the culture. Part II.E
examines how this gender system is different from what Wes-
terners term "homosexual" or "transsexual." Part II.F explores
how the tradition died off in the recent past, and how radically
tribe members' values have changed in order to yield the reac-
tion to McKinley and Reynolds' marriage.
A. Reification and Ethnocentrism
There are few truly universal traits shared by all cultures
around the world; gender is one of them.47 Observable anatomi-
cal sex at birth is used to direct children into a particular gender
1952 as a collection with updated commentary). There are many different
names for the people Kroeber described. One common term in the literature
is "Berdache," which is etymologically derived from the French word for
"male prostitute." This author chooses not to use this term because it is a
slur that inaccurately reflects the behaviors of these individuals in many of
the traditional tribal cultures discussed supra. Instead this comment will ar-
bitrarily use the Mohave terms, simply because the Mohave have two sepa-
rate terms-to refer to these gender-crossing individuals. See, e.g.,
JONATHAN KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN
THE U.S.A., 423, 440, 451 (Avon Discus Publishing 1976) (a collection of ac-
counts of homosexual behavior and acceptance among various tribes indica-
tive of tribes' broadly variant treatment of individuals engaged in these
behaviors).
46 George Devereux, Institutionalized Homosexuality of the Mohave Indians,
9 HUMAN BIOLOGY 498, 500 (1937).
47 See HARRIET WHITEHEAD, The Bow and the Burden Strap: A New Look
at Institutionalized Homosexuality in Native North America, in LESBIAN &
GAY STUDIES READER 501 (Henry Abelove et. al. eds., 1993).
[Vol. 2:194 DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GENDER & L.
20111 NORMAL FOR WHOM? 95
role or set of expectations.48 This means that both naturally-
created, biological differences and socially constructed expecta-
tions are at work in the gender system.4 9 The features of the
social construct-gender-are not universal but the existence of
a construct is universal.
Gender is in important respects a product of reification; we
forget that we, rather than biological predestination, are the au-
thors of gendered expectations.5 0 Attempting to describe the
social constructs surrounding gender and sexuality is fraught
with pitfalls of inadvertent ethnocentrism.5 1 Avoiding an ethno-
centric bias in describing native North American social norms is
made more complicated due to two problems.
The first of these problems is that while gender is culturally
specific, there is not, strictly speaking, one "culture" of native
North America.52 For the purpose of this comment, it is suffi-
cient that many tribes had some socially sanctioned, or at least
socially tolerated, form of the Alyha or Hwame gender. Tribal
views ranged from mild animosity to active encouragement of
Alyha or Hwame identities. 5 3 Native North American tribes
seemed to be more accepting of deviation from the gender bi-
nary than Europeans were. This comment will focus on similari-
ties and differences between the average western and Native-
American cultural expectations.
48 Id. at 501 ("A social gender dichotomy is present in all known societies in
the sense that everywhere anatomic sexual differences observable at birth are
used to start tracking the newborn into one or the other of two social role
complexes. This minimal pegging of social roles and relationships to observa-
ble anatomic sex differences is what creates what we call a 'gender' dichot-
omy in the first place, but in no culture does it exhaust the ideas surrounding
the two classes thus minimally constituted.").
49 See id. at 504.
50 See id. at 499-500.
51 See id.
52 See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services From the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,810 (Oct. 1, 2010)
(notice) (listing the 564 "tribal entities" within the contiguous forty-eight
North American states recognized and eligible to receive services from the
U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs). See also KATZ, supra note 45.
53 WHITEHEAD, supra note 47, at 502-03.
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The second problem is that most of the primary source mate-
rial on Native American culture is biased by western ethnocen-
trism. In modern anthropologic circles, ethnocentric bias is
avoided, a practice known as cultural relativism. 54 This practice
emerged in the nineteenth century, but most accounts of Native
American tribal practices predate cultural relativism.55
Before cultural relativism took root, scientists and social
thinkers in western culture tended to view the gradual adoption
of our views, such as the social stigmatization of supernatural
phenomenon, as cultural ascension.56 For example, Native
American tribes that ascribed positive supernatural value to au-
ditory hallucinations realized that these experiences were unu-
sual or different from normal reality; they merely saw this as a
positive divergence from reality.57 "The values have changed
rather than the perception. And values are cultural facts."5 8
The tribes that noted-anthropologist Alfred Kroeber observed
were not deficient or naive; they merely attached different val-
ues to the perception of mental phenomena. 59 They also saw
homosexual behavior and gender-transgression as socially ac-
ceptable, sometimes even as valuable.60
Even after the emergence of cultural relativism, the extreme
social condemnation of homosexuality by western anthropolo-
gists bled into their cultural accounts. Kroeber still associated
the social acceptance of institutionalized passive homosexuality
with backwardness. 61 Part of the difficulty arising from account-
ing for various tribes' acceptance or condemnation of these gen-
54 See KROEBER supra note 45, at 317-18 (eschewing the ethnocentric views
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and noting the "growing recogni-
tion of cultural relativism" among anthropologists).
55 Id.
56 See id. at 313 (discussing acceptance of seeing ghosts, hearing voices, re-
ceiving prophecies-symptoms of psychosis).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 See id. at 317.
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der-nonconformists, flows from this cultural taint.6 2 Kroeber
explained the difficulty:
While the institution [of cross-dressing or recog-
nized homosexuality] was in full bloom, the Cau-
casian attitude was one of repugnance and
condemnation. This attitude quickly became com-
municated to the Indians and made subsequent
personality inquiry difficult, the later berdaches
leading repressed or disguised lives.63
This acknowledgement came from an anthropologist that at-
tempted to adopt cultural relativism, but still shunned some
forms of homosexuality.
One of the fullest accounts, with a concerted effort to be unbi-
ased, came from George Devereux, who embedded himself with
the Mohave in Arizona and California. Devereux reported the
Mohave's folklore, music, and social traditions via quotes from
tribe members. Devereux's account is notable in its complete-
ness 6 4 and will be relied on heavily as illustration.
B. European and Native American Gender Systems
Focus on Different Traits
While every culture imports some social expectations onto an-
atomical difference, the resultant constructions might be radi-
cally different. Both western and Native American societies
actually use the same four traits to define an adult's gender:
namely, sexual object choice, sexual role, clothing, and produc-
tive activity.65
Sexual object choice and sexual role are the most important
features of gender identity in western culture; deviating from
the heterosexual norm in either respect changes one's identity
62 See id. at 313.
63 Id. at 313.
64 See WHITEHEAD, supra note 47, at 511.
65 Id. at 513.
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or status irrevocably. 66 Meaning that if you engage in homosex-
ual sex in western society you are called a homosexual, or at
least bi-sexual; your status is changed by your sexual object
choice. Unlike in western society, homosexual acts would not
redefine a person in most Native American societies.67 Instead,
productive activity or work and clothing are the most important
traits for defining and categorizing a person's gender in Native
American societies. 68 One of the most defining features of gen-
der in Native American cultures was productive occupation;
many tribes considered boys to be Alyha because they preferred
women's work over men's work. 69 Work and clothing were far
more important to Native American identity than they were to
western identity.
C. The Different Focus of the Native American
Gender Scheme
Perhaps because the Native American gender system was
based on different personal traits, tribal communities' viewed
deviation from the norm differently than westerners. Their cul-
tures also valued women and men, vis-A-vis each other, differ-
ently.70 Kroeber noted their different view on deviation: "[1]ike
ourselves, they regard both [psychological phenomena and gen-
der nonconformity] as not normal, in the sense of not being
common, everyday in character, or in line with the majority of
experienced events. But their social affects towards these are
positive or neutral; ours are negative."71 "To us a person that
hears the dead speak, or proclaims that he sometimes turns into
a bear, is socially abnormal, at best useless, and likely to be a
66 Id. at 513, 524. See also ESTHER NEWTON, Role Models, in SYMBOLIC AN-
THROPOLOGY: READER IN THE STUDY OF SYMBOLS & MEANING 337, 341 (J.
Dolgin, et. al. eds., 1977).
67 WHITEHEAD, supra note 47, at 512-13.
68 Id. at 513.
69 Id. at 504 (specifically noting "Yurok of northern California," "The Crow
of the Plains," "The prairie-dwelling Miami," and tribes of the Southwest
more generally).
70 See id. at 500, 502-03. See also KATZ, supra note 45.
71 KROEBER, supra note 54, at 314.
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burden or menace." 72 Experiences that western culture would
consider evidence of psychosis were seen as positive attributes
by Lassik and Wailaki people.73 Part of some Native Ameri-
can's positive attitude towards auditory hallucinations is proba-
bly related to their belief that dreams and hallucinations can
show one his destiny or give him special powers or lead him to a
socially prized occupation.74
In the cultures of Native American tribes, gender was not
only defined differently, but the relative positions of women and
men were also different with respect to each other. Since
women's work could be economically productive, women could
bring economic prestige to their family unit.75 Social hierarchy
within most Native American tribes depended on economic pro-
ductivity or prestige. 76 This led to men and women being more
socially equal than in contemporaneous western culture, which
was still typified by coverture.77 Gender equality might explain
the relative acceptability of straying from traditional gender
limits.78
D. Gender Nonconformity is a Major Difference
Perhaps because of the different methods of defining gender
and assigning social prestige, Native American tribes permitted
gender expression that did not align with anatomical sex. Native
American tribes accepted, or at least tolerated, non-binary gen-
72 Id. at 312.
73 Id. at 310 ("[I]n some cultures one of the most respected and rewarded
statuses known to the society is acquired only by experience of a condition
which in our culture we could not label anything else than psychotic.").
74 Id. at 315.
75 WHITEHEAD, supra note 47, at 518-19.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 520; see, e.g., Married Women's Act, 1861 Ill. Laws 143. Coverture
was the legal status of women (particularly married women) under European
law and it lasted through the 1800's in most jurisdictions, essentially un-
changed. See BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 422 (9th ed. 2009). The Illinois
statute is a good example of the denial of legal personhood to women in the
United States.
78 WHITEHEAD, supra note 47, at 520.
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der expression, and homosexual behavior within their communi-
ties.79 Among the Mohave these gender nonconformists were
called Alyha and Hwame, but both gender types existed in many
North American tribal communities throughout the country.80
Tribal languages described them,81 and social customs pre-
scribed their behavior within the intermediate gender category.
The system did not erase anatomical difference from cultural
perception, however. References to these people in tribal folk-
lore, creation myths, and traditional ceremonies demonstrate
how embedded in tribal custom this gender status was. Tribal
society's treatment of sexual expression contemplated their exis-
tence too. This sub-part looks at each of these features of the
Native American gender scheme in turn.
1. Alyha and Hwame Statuses are Simultaneously
Both and Neither Gender
Because gender in Native American tribal cultures was first
defined by occupation and clothing or by mannerisms, and only
secondarily influenced by sexual role and sexual object choice,82
it comes as no surprise that Alyha did women's work in women's
clothes. Among the Mohave, boys destined to become Alyha
would reportedly, prior to puberty, eschew the toys typical for
little boys and instead display an affinity towards girls' and
women's games and desire girls' dresses.83 Similarly, girls des-
tined to become Hwame were fonder of boys' toys, games, and
clothes than girls' and women's pursuits and garb. 84 Both Alyha
and Hwame used gender-specific words or phrases as well;
speaking the way the opposite sex spoke.85 Through these ten-
79 Id. at 500, 502.
80 Id. at 503. The tradition of gender-crossing was recorded "throughout the
Plateau, Plains, Southwest, Prairie, and Southeastern regions of the continen-
tal United States and deep into Mesoamerica. Data are missing for the At-
lantic and Northeastern states regions. See id.
81 See KATZ, supra note 45.
82 See WHITEHEAD supra note 47, at 504-24.
83 Id. at 502.
84 Id. at 503.
85 Id. at 504.
100 DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GENDER & L. [Vol. 2:1
dencies or behaviors, the Alyha effectively became women in
the eyes of their tribe. 86
Alyha were more than "women" in tribal societies, however,
and Hwame were more than "men." "Throughout most of the
continent, the 'part-man, part-woman,' was not thought to be,
nor forced into the pretense of being, woman in the physiologi-
cal 'Parts.' "87 Unlike in western culture, both anatomical fea-
tures and behavioral traits-like occupation-equally defined
an individual's gender; thus, "when a nonconcordance arose,....
neither criterion was used as a final determinant of gender sta-
tus. Instead, the individual became half the one thing, half the
other."8 8 Alyha were frequently described as neither man nor
woman-or as both man and woman simultaneously. 89
Despite this recognition, Alyha and Hwame individuals still
experience social marginalization. For example some traditions
of familial lineage were not extended to Alyha or Hwame mar-
riages, because the traditions were described as being somehow
too serious.90 This demonstrates social marginalization in spite
of their social incorporation: they did get married, but it was a
bit different. The Hwame and Alyha were not simply "men"
and "women," they were also both and neither.
2. The Inequality of Women and the Alyha and
Hwame Traditions
Even among the gender-crossers, women and men were not
treated identically. In North American cultures, anatomical
men enjoyed a privileged status over anatomical women.91
Bravery was one of the most valued qualities in Mohave men,
86 See Devereux, supra note 46, at 502.
87 WHITEHEAD, supra note 47, at 507. See also Devereux, supra note 46, at
510 ("You can tease an hwame, because she is just a woman, but if you tease
an alyha, who has the strength of a man, he will run after you and beat you
up.").
88 WHITEHEAD, supra note 47, at 506-07.
89 Id. at 505.
90 Devereux, supra note 46, at 507.
91 See KATZ, supra note 45, at 427.
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and Alyha formed the root of the term 'coward' in the lan-
guage.92 In this way, Alyha were sometimes teased for essen-
tially stepping down from prized manliness.93
Hwame were not accepted in as many tribes as Alyha were. 94
Tribes were more likely to recognize a Hwame-like status
merely in their folklore rather than in their community.95 Tribes
passed along stories of female-bodied people successfully per-
forming the masculine gender role, gaining some measure of
masculine status in the process. 96 Even in tribes that did recog-
nize the status, Hwame were less likely than Alyha to be identi-
fied as "men," even if they were referred to with male pronouns,
married women as a husband, or became warriors.97 The social
difference in the acceptability of Hwame and Alyha might be
explained by the pervasive spiritually-based taboo of menstrua-
tion.98 Devereux also posited that Hwame's susceptibility to
rape was another reason for their relative rarity as compared
with their male-bodied counterparts.99 Because the Hwame sta-
tus could not overcome these anatomical differences, girls were
particularly discouraged from becoming Hwame.100
3. Alyha and Hwame are in the Traditions, Religion, and
Folklore of the Tribes
The tradition of gender-crossing is deeply rooted in tribal cul-
ture and religion.o1 The Kamia, close relatives of the Mohave,
92 Devereux, supra note 46, at 517.
93 WHITEHEAD, supra note 47, at 506.
94 Id. at 507.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See KATZ, supra note 45, at 433-34, 451; see also KATZ, supra note 45, at
459-69 (excerpting EDWIN T. DENIG; BIOGRAPHY OF A WOMAN CHIEF
(1855-56)).
98 See WHITEHEAD, supra note 47, at 508-09 (discussing menstruation
taboos in the gender-crossing tradition at length).
99 See Devereux, supra note 46, at 519.
100 Id. at 503.
101 See id. at 501.
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have a folk tale with a gender-crosser as the hero.102 The Mo-
have trace their cultural recognition of gender nonconformity to
their creation myths.103 Their religion expressly sanctioned both
the Alyha and the Hwame.104 They believed that at the begin-
ning of the world the God Matavilye told them that "some
among them would turn into transvestites." 0 5 The Mohave re-
ligion taught that the tendency towards the status of Alyha or
Hwame originated in utero and became noticeable before
puberty. 106
Religion also played a role in recognizing this tendency in a
child.10 7 If a child showed a predisposition towards being Alyha
or Hwame, family members "soon realize[d] that nothing can be
done about it,"108 so they prepared an initiation ceremony to
officially confirm the status. 109 The ceremony originated with
the god Mastambo. 0 The highly ritualized ceremony was not a
transformation but an affirmation of a pre-existing, immutable
identity."'
The cultural incorporation of Alyha went further than relig-
ion, folklore, and the initiation ceremony. In some tribes, the
Alyha held special occupations, including a special wartime
role.112 Alyha and Hwame were said to have positive attributes
like good luck or powerful shamanism.1 3 In fact, "shamans spe-
cializing in the cure of hikupk (syphilis), were lucky in love and
had no difficulty in obtaining homosexual spouses."114 This is
102 Id. at 501.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 503.
106 Id. at 501; see also id. at 507 (explaining that boys were initiated as Alyha
as early as age ten or eleven).
107 See id. at 506.
108 Id. at 503 (quoting a tribe-member's description of the family's reaction
to the cultural practice).
109 Id. at 505.
110 Id. at 506.
111 Id. at 509.
112 WHITEHEAD, supra note 47, at 506.
113 Devereux, supra note 46, at 516.
114 Id. (discussing shamans that were not Alyha or Hwame).
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similar to how women in our culture are said to be more com-
passionate or how gay men are known to be good dancers; it is
all part of the gender scheme.
4. Defining the Alyha and Hwame Role
The Mohave adhered to strict sexual role-playing, which ex-
tended to the Alyha and Hwame performing the role of their
adopted gender.115 Youths engaged in sexually explicit play:
showing each other their genitals, nicknaming playmates for fea-
tures of each other's genitalia, mutual masturbation, and older
boys forcibly engaging in anal sex with younger children.116
However, pedophilia was proscribed among adult men.117 Mo-
have spoke frequently of sex and genitalia.118 Gender-crossing
individuals insisted their sexual organs be referred to as those of
their performative gender.119 At least among Mohave, anal and
oral penetrative sex was so accepted in heterosexual couples
that for a man to marry an Alyha woman would not greatly
change his sexual expression within the marriage-sexual role
was more important.120
115 See id. at 510-11. The informants' reports speak freely of masturbation,
oral and anal sex with men, anal sex with women, and manual stimulation of
women or men. Id. at 511. But when asking one man if he would play with
his Alyha-wife's erection, the man responded "She would kill me." Id. Oral
sex with women was taboo because vaginal secretions were seen as smelly;
any sort of sex with old women led to mocking her suitor because of the
perceived bad 'old woman' smell. Id. at 519. Anal intercourse with women
was seen as "the proper way to prepare immature girls for marriage"; that,
along with the acceptance of fellatio led Devereux to speculate that being
with an Alyha wife was probably not much different than being with an ana-
tomically female one. Id. at 514.
116 Id. at 499.
117 Id. at 500.
118 Id. at 510.
119 Id.
120 See id. at 514.
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E. Similarities and Differences between Alyha and Hwame
Traditions and Western Homosexual Identities
It is not entirely accurate to describe the social statuses within
Native American communities by any of the terms that we
might use to describe non-binary gender expression in western
culture. Homosexual, transgendered, and transsexual all carry
social connotations specific to our gender system.121 This is in
part because the western gender system is defined primarily by
sexual object choice; whereas, the Native American gender
scheme relies more on occupation.122 That being said, there is
an aspect of gender crossing in at least some Native American
cultures that is linked to what western culture now calls
homosexuality. 123
The Native American's view of homosexuality is easily distin-
guishable from the perspective of Westerners:
It is only since eighteenth-century enlightenment
that homosexuality has begun to be regarded in
Occidental civilization as somewhat less than the
ultimate abomination and offense. Our tolerance
toward it has increased in proportion with what
we call our enlightenment. And certainly the
American Indian system seems to work well from
the angle of human happiness: the invert is free to
work out his inner satisfactions as he can, without
persecution from without; and society does not
feel itself injured or endangered. A status of ad-
justment is achieved instead of one of conflict and
tension.124
121 See WHITEHEAD, supra note 47, at 501.
122 See id. at 501, 505.
123 See KROEBER, supra note 45, at 314 ("In berdachism accordingly we have
another sex of psychiatric phenomena, those of sexual inversion, which our
culture still regards as abnormal, a social if not antisocial, and in general
views with considerable affect of repugnance, but which certain primitives
accept with equanimity and provide a definite social channel for.").
124 Id. at 314.
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This quote demonstrates Kroeber's observation that acceptance
of homosexuality might be correlated with enlightenment, even
while he uses the derogatory terms of the 1940's, calling homo-
sexuals "inverts."125
1. Sexual Object Choice is Not Determinative of Identity
An earlier traveler to the American Southwest also reported
institutionally accepted homosexual behavior among the Mo-
have. 126 The link between the institution of gender-crossers and
the acceptability of homosexual behaviors is admittedly obfus-
cated, because "the North American Indian attitude toward the
berdache stresses not his erotic life but his social status; born a
male, he became accepted as a woman socially."127
Being the sexual partner of an Alyha or Hwame would not
change the Mohave to the official gender-crossing status.128 The
idea that sexual behavior might force a Mohave man into the
Alyha status was "unanimously discredited" by the Mohaves
with which Devereux spoke.129 "Once a young person started
off 'right' there is no danger of his or her becoming homosexual
(alyha or hwame) even if occasional unions with homosexuals
should occur."130 Merely engaging in homosexual sex occasion-
ally or during childhood did not transform a man into an official
homosexual, or an Alyha, in the Mohave community.131 The
idea that homosexual sex is not determinative of Alyha status
strongly differentiates it from modern, western "homosexual"
status.
Some people in contemporary western culture might suggest
that the Alyha were transsexual or transgendered because they
"were allowed among many American Indian tribes to assume
125 See id.
126 Devereux, supra note 46, at 498.
127 KROEBER, supra note 45, at 313.
128 Devereux, supra note 46, at 500-01.
129 Id. at 507-08.
130 Id. at 501 (quoting a tribe member's explanation of the social practice).
131 Id. at 500.
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officially the status of a woman."13 2 Unlike trans-women in
modern culture, however, the Mohave Alyha were still publicly
acknowledged to be anatomically male. 133 In some tribes, the
Alyha were reported as openly engaging in sex with both gen-
ders without compromising their sexual partners' gender iden-
tity.134 This further separates their status from their anatomical
sex and reinforces their status as both male and female. They do
not conform to western culture's definition of homosexual or
transsexual.
Homosexual acts do not redefine a person in most Native
American societies, unlike in western society.135 Rather, the re-
definition happened through a ritualized dream or vision, or
through general preference during youth.136
In contradistinction to occupational and clothing
choice, cross-sex erotic choice is never mentioned
as one of the indicators of the budding berdache.
It was not as if homosexual behavior was unrecog-
nized in North America. Homosexual acts be-
tween persons of ordinary gender status were
known to occur or were recognized as a possibility
among a number of tribes on which data are avail-
able. In some cases such behavior seems to have
met with no objection; more often, it was nega-
tively sanctioned as some sort of evil, inadequacy,
or foolishness.137
Even this social condemnation did not rise to the level of trans-
forming someone's perceived identity.
132 Id. at 520.
133 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. It is hard to say if this is a
product of the Alyha's inability to physically transform her genitalia, or if it
may evidence some psychological status or self-conception different from the
transpeople in our country today.
134 WHITEHEAD, supra note 47, at 512.
135 See id. at 512. See also supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
136 Id. at 503. See also supra notes 101-111 and accompanying text.
137 Id. at 511 (internal citations omitted) (referencing multiple accounts from
various tribes at different times).
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2. Dating and Marrying Alyha or Hwame as Part of the
Cultural Tradition
Alyha and Hwame sexual relationships, including marriages,
generally conformed with their adopted gender rather than their
anatomical sex.138 But some Mohave, who were not identified
as Alyha or Hwame, only took same-sex spouses.139 Most often
the Alyha or Hwame marriages were second marriages, either
polygamist or after an earlier divorce.140 In some tribes, men
would boast about flirting with Alyha and having sex with
them.141
At dances even boys who had no intention of marrying an
Alyha played around with them, as though they were flirtatious
women.142 "In the end some of them made up their minds to
become the husbands of an alyha."14 3 Once they were married
the Alyha made exceptionally industrious wives.144
Alyha could be courted and Hwame could court but neither
could participate in the most acceptable form of courting, which
involved a boy sleeping beside a girl in her parent's home for
several nights before taking her as a wife.145 Rather, Alyha were
courted "like widows, divorcees or lewd women," and Hwame
courted the same set of women. 146 The Hwame occasionally
took wives as men would.147 The Alyha and Hwame perform-
ance of the social roles of the opposite sex extended to marital
status.148
138 Id. at 510.
139 Devereux, supra note 46, at 518.
140 WHITEHEAD, supra note 47, at 510.
141 Id.
142 Devereux, supra note 46, at 513 (quoting an unnamed Mohave
informant).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Devereux, supra note 46, at 515.
148 WHITEHEAD, supra note 47, at 503; see generally Devereux, supra note
46, at 514-15.
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Kroeber and Devereux both quoted the story of Kuwal, a Mo-
have shaman who had married several Alyha during his life-
time.149 Kuwal explained that the Mohave did tease the spouses
of Alyha and Hwame for choosing a spouse of the same anatom-
ical sex; however, there was no point in teasing the Alyha or
Hwame because they could not help but be who they were.150
F. Acculturation in Process
This complex institutionalized gender system, so different
from our own, has largely disappeared. Accounts of Native
Americans' acceptance of homosexuality or non-binary gender
expression are found in the outrage of European missionaries at
the tribes' failure to condemn these "deviants."' 5' Kroeber ex-
plained that these observers' views were being communicated to
the culture and influencing it.152
Alyha and Hwame had mostly disappeared in the northwest-
ern United States as early as the late 1800's.153
In the old days, a few men (some of them proba-
bly hermaphrodites or homosexuals) donned
women's clothing and took up women's occupa-
tions. Some such persons are still known, but all
of them are middle-aged or older. It may be that
the bachelors in their thirties who live in various
communities today are individuals of these two
types who fear the ridicule of white persons and so
do not change clothing.154
149 Devereux, supra note 46, at 521-23; KROEBER, supra note 45, at 316.
150 Devereux, supra note 46, at 515, 518.
151 See KATZ, supra note 45, at 451-52 (quoting Issac McCoy who visited the
Osage around 1828 and expressed disgust with an Alyha among them).
152 See KROEBER, supra note 45, at 313-14.
153 WHITEHEAD, supra note 47, at 502.
154 KATZ, supra note 45, at 490 (quoting DOROTHEA LEIGHTON & CLYDE
KLUCKHOHN, CHILDREN OF THE PEOPLE: THE NAVAHO INDIVIDUAL AND
HIS DEVELOPMENT 708-12 (Harvard Univ. Press 1948)); see also KATZ, supra
note 45, at 472-78 (quoting MATILDA COXE STEVENSON, A DEATH WHICH
CAUSED UNIVERSAL REGRET (1896-97)).
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Other accounts note that after about 1900 the Alyha stopped
cross-dressing but still retained the social status Alyha.155
Perhaps because of its remoteness, homosexuality was still so-
cially accepted on the Mohave reservation as late as the 1930's,
although none of the residents self-identified as homosexual. 56
Several men on the reservation were rumored to be homosexu-
als, two of whom lived together and were "usually referred to as
each other's wives and are said to indulge in rectal inter-
course."157 One of Devereux's interviewees related that it was a
shock to discover that an Alyha-friend was not an anatomical
woman.158 This may suggest that the tribal population was be-
coming less accustomed to the tradition. Devereux pointed out
that in the 1930's on the Mohave reservation, "[t]o call a person
a 'homosexual' when he is not, is a bad insult and is fiercely
resented."159
By 1940, Kroeber spoke of the institution of gender-crossing
as a system that had been stamped out and repressed.160 Now,
Native Americans share the European's attitude; an excellent
example of this attitude is the tribes' reaction to the marriage of
Dawn McKinley and Kathy Reynolds, discussed in part I above.
The adoption of western cultural views might be attributable to
various changes, such as "increases of the size of the social
group, technological or economic factors, the growth of science,
[and] a greater sense of security."'61 For Native American cul-
155 WHITEHEAD, supra note 47, at 505 ("[I]t was possible in the twentieth
century for persons to maintain the gender-crossed status by occupation
alone while dressing, in response to white pressure, as befitted anatomic
sex."); see also Devereux, supra note 46, at 509 ("[N]owadays homosexuals
do not don the garb of the opposite sex.").
156 See Devereux, supra note 46, at 498.
157 Id. at 498-99.
158 Id. at 507 (noting Devereux's suspicion that the informant's surprise was
probably feigned).
159 Devereux, supra note 46, at 518. It is unclear if Devereux here means
"homosexual" as in "someone who has sex with people of the same gender"
or as in "someone who is Alyha or Hwame." He uses both somewhat
interchangeably.
160 See KROEBER, supra note 45, at 313-14.
161 Id. at 313.
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tures, the acculturation process may have been caused by less
benign triggers.
HI. LEGAL REPRESSION OF NATIVE
AMERICAN COMMUNITIES
One possible explanation for the disconnect between present
and past value systems was supplied by Jonathan Katz, who
compiled an extensive array of historical documentation of
these traditions:
One fact that emerges clearly here is that the
Christianization of Native Americans and the co-
lonial appropriation of the continent by White,
Western 'civilization' included the attempt by the
conquerors to eliminate various traditional forms
of Indian homosexuality-as part of their attempt
to destroy that Native culture which might fuel re-
sistance-a form of cultural genocide involving
both Native Americans and Gay people. Today,
the recovery of the history of Native American
homosexuality is a task in which both Gay and Na-
tive peoples have a common interest.162
Katz suggests that part of this "cultural genocide" was caused
intentionally. However, many other, unintentional, factors
could have also contributed to this cultural genocide. This sec-
tion focuses on three contributing factors-of the intentional
sort-pointed out by Katz: land appropriation, Christianization
efforts, and the destruction of native cultural practices. Part
III.A of this comment looks at the Discovery Doctrine and how
Christian dogma was employed initially to subjugate Indians.
Part III.B examines federal governmental actions specifically
designed to promote Christianization and to suppress native Re-
ligious or Cultural Practices among Native American Communi-
ties. Part III.C looks at how Native Americans' lost property
rights augment their religious oppression even into the late 20th
162 Id. at 429.
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Century. While the federal government is not solely to blame
for the loss of traditional Native American cultural practices and
belief systems, federal actions have contributed to the accultura-
tion of Native American people and the loss of some aspects of
their tribal identities.
A. The Discovery Doctrine in the U.S. Strips
Tribes of their Property
Building on centuries of European common law, two early
United States Supreme Court cases established Native Ameri-
cans' lack of sovereignty and the incorporeal nature of their
property rights. These cases perpetuated the European "Dis-
covery Doctrine," and set the stage for later acts which further
marginalized the Native American population.
1. Origins of the Discovery Doctrine
When Europeans first arrived in the Americas, they claimed
the land they "discovered" for their monarchs; their self-ap-
pointed right to discovery traces back to Pope Nicholas V, who
in 1455, granted Portugal the right "'to invade, search out, cap-
ture, vanquish, and subdue all Saracens and pagans whatsoever,
and other enemies' . . . to put them into perpetual slavery, and
to take all their possessions and property." 6 3 In 1493, King
Henry VII of England issued a royal decree to John Cabot, The
Cabot Charter, which was similar to the Pope's decree.164 This
European, Christian tradition led to the creation of all of the
colonies in North America.165 The conquest of the future Amer-
ican colonies by the British consisted of John Cabot sailing
163 Steven T. Newcomb, The Evidence of Christian Nationalism in Federal
Indian Law: The Doctrine of Discovery, Johnson v. McIntosh, and Plenary
Power, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 303, 310 (1993) (quoting EURO-
PEAN TREATIES BEARING ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
DEPENDENCIES TO 1648 23 (Frances G. Davenport ed. 1917)).
164 Id. at 311; see also, Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 576
(1823). In the same year, Pope Alexander VI gave Spain the lands discov-
ered by Christopher Columbus. Newcomb, supra note 163, at 310.
165 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 579-80.
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along the Atlantic coastline without coming ashore.166 Spain,
France, Great Britain, Portugal, and Holland all based their ac-
quisitions in North America on the right granted by the Pope, to
appropriate discovered lands that "were not actually possessed
by any Christian prince or people." 1 6 7
European nations recognized their respective claims to Na-
tive-occupied lands through treaties.168 Treaties between the
Europeans and Native Americans, however, were not honored:
the Board of Indian Commissionersl 69 included in its first re-
port, the United States' "shameful record of broken treaties and
unfulfilled promises" to the tribes.170 It seems that the differ-
ence between asserting European ownership under the doctrine,
and asserting Native occupants' ownership, was the Natives' sta-
tus as non-Christians:171
[T]he character and religion of [this immense con-
tinent's] inhabitants afforded an apology for con-
sidering them as a people over whom the superior
genius of Europe might claim an ascendency. The
166 Id. at 576; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 3-4
(1831) (syllabus) ("The foundation of this charter, the bill states is asserted to
be the right of discovery to the territory granted; a ship manned by the sub-
jects of the king having, 'about two centuries and a half before, sailed along
the coast of the western hemisphere, from the fifty-sixth to the thirty-eighth
degree of north latitude, and looked upon the face of that coast without even
landing on any part of it."').
167 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574-77.
168 Id. at 581 (discussing the European nations' use of treaties to resolve land
disputes among themselves even though the lands in question were occupied
by Native American tribes).
169 See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
170 Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nine-
teenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American
Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 773 (1997) (quoting BD. OF IN-
DIAN COMM'Rs., ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1869)). See also Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. at 23-24 (Johnson, J. concurring) ("[I]t was wise to prepare
them for what was probably then contemplated, to wit, to incorporate them
in time into our respective governments: a policy which their inveterate hab-
its and deep seated enmity has altogether baffled.").
171 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 576 ("The right of discovery given by [the Cabot]
commission, is confined to countries 'then unknown to all Christian peo-
ple."'); see Dussias, supra note 171, at 822-23.
20111 NORMAL FOR WHOM? 113
potentates of the old world found no difficulty in
convincing themselves that they made ample com-
pensation to the inhabitants of the new, by be-
stowing on [the Native Americans] civilization and
Christianity, in exchange for unlimited indepen-
dence.172
Essentially, the Native Americans were divested of sovereignty
and title in their land, and in exchange they got Christianity.173
2. The Discovery Doctrine's Introduction into
United States Law
When Native American's property rights to their ancestral
lands came before the Supreme Court, in Johnson v. McIntosh,
in 1823, the Court first recognized the Discovery Doctrine.174
Europeans were on both sides of the dispute: the plaintiffs had
purchased their land from Native American tribal elders,175 and
the defendants had gotten their land from the federal govern-
ment. 76 Throughout the settlement of North America, Europe-
ans had occasionally purchased land from Native Americans
and then had their ownership recognized by the crown or equity
courts.17 7 Since the plaintiffs' ownership had not been recog-
nized by any European court, the question became: do Native
Americans own their tribal lands such that the conveyance of
these lands to other individuals would be recognized by the
courts of the United States?17s
172 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573.
173 Id. at 573-74. "Although we do not mean to engage in the defence of
those principles which Europeans have applied to Indian title, they may, we
think, find some excuse, if not justification, in the character and habits of the
people whose rights have been wrested from them." Id. at 589.
174 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 543. See generally Newcomb, supra, note 163. See
also Dussias, supra note 170, at 822-23.
175 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 571-72.
176 See id. at 560.
177 Id. at 600-03.
178 See id. at 571.
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Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the court in Johnson is
known for establishing the legal concept of "Indian Title."1 7 9 In-
dian Title is an exclusive right to occupancy subject to the gov-
ernment's legal ownership of the land.180 Justice Marshall
wrote, "The ceded territory was occupied by numerous and war-
like tribes of Indians; but the exclusive right of the United States
to extinguish their title, and to grant the soil, has never, we be-
lieve, been doubted ... ."
Even though European nations and colonial governments had
executed treaties with the tribes, this provided no help to Native
American claimants.182 "[D]iscovery gave an exclusive right to
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or
by conquest[.]"183 Indian title became a temporary right to oc-
cupy the land claimed by the United States, until such time as
the United States chose to send Europeans there under claim of
right.18 4
The Court supported the extinguishable nature of Indian Title
with a few different assertions. First, the Court framed the ac-
quisition of Native Americans' lands as the spoils of war: "Con-
quest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot
deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individu-
als may be, respecting the original justice of the claim which has
been successfully asserted." 185 Then the court simply argued
that it was too late to try and recognize Native Americans' own-
ership; our entire country was founded on taking Native Ameri-
cans' lands.186
179 Id. at 565-69.
180 See id.
181 Id. at 586.
182 See generally Johnson, 21 U.S. at 597-99 (explaining that past purchases
by Europeans of tribal lands were done simply to placate the dangerous na-
tives; similarly, expansion away from already-established European settle-
ments was restrained not for lack of legal right but out of fear of the natives).
183 Id. at 587.
184 See id.
185 Id. at 588.
186 See id. at 579 ("Thus has our whole country been granted by the crown
while in the occupation of the Indians."). See also Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591
("[I]f a country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the
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Five years after Johnson established Indian Title, Georgia
passed several laws that appropriated lands and gold mines held
by the Cherokee Nation within the territorial limits of Geor-
gia.187 Until that time, Cherokees had managed to keep posses-
sion of their lands by promising to behave like a "civilized,"
Christian, agrarian society.188 They made this promise for good
reason; many Cherokee people had previously been forcibly re-
moved to United-States-assigned territories in Oklahoma, and
were killed by other tribes upon their arrival.
In the Cherokees' attempt at securing their title, the Chero-
kee Nation emphasized, to the Court, their adoption of Chris-
tian traditions.189 The Cherokees in Georgia explained that
their community had formed a government modeled after the
United States.190 The Cherokees established schools, largely
converted to Christianity, and abided by their treaty obligations
with the United States.191
Adopting the trappings of western society was insufficient to
protect the Cherokees' title because the Supreme Court would
have had to recognize the tribe as a foreign state-a fellow sov-
ereign-in order to hear the case.192 Justice Johnson, who con-
curred in the result, warned against recognizing Indians as
foreign states:
Where is the rule to stop? Must every petty kraal
of Indians, designating themselves a tribe or na-
tion, and having a few hundred acres of land to
hunt on exclusively, be recognized as a state? We
should indeed force into the family of nations, a
great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land
and cannot be questioned.").
187 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 7 (1831) (syllabus).
188 See id. at 5-6, 9-10.
189 See id. at 6.
190 See id.
191 See id.
192 See id. at 15-16 (The Cherokees sued under the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction.).
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very numerous and very heterogeneous
progeny.193
Marshall, writing for the court, was no more sympathetic to the
Cherokees' situation:
If it be true that the Cherokee nation have rights,
this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to
be asserted. If it be true that wrongs have been
inflicted, and that still greater are to be appre-
hended, this is not the tribunal which can redress
the past or prevent the future. 194
The Supreme Court dismissed the Cherokees' claims due to lack
of standing, because the Indian tribes were neither foreign
states, nor domestic states195-but "domestic dependent
nations."196
Through Johnson, the Supreme Court established that Native
Americans' lands were technically the property of the federal
government subject only to Indian Title-an occupancy right
that could be extinguished at will. Through Cherokee Nation,
the Supreme Court established Native Americans' position as
"domestic dependent nations." These two concepts laid the
groundwork for future actions by the federal government that
contributed to the decline of tribal traditions.
B. Federal Laws Promoted Christianity &
Suppressed Native Religion
Starting in 1871, the United States changed its policy on deal-
ing with tribal nations to begin treating them as wards rather
than adversaries or non-entities.197 The federal government be-
gan implementing laws and regulations specifically designed to
193 Id. at 25. See also id. at 21 (Johnson, J. concurring in result) ("I cannot
but think that there are strong reasons for doubting the applicability of the
epithet state, to a people so low in the grade of organized society as our
Indian tribes most generally are.").
194 Id. at 20.
195 See id. at 16.
196 Id. at 17.
197 See 17 AM. JUR. 2D Treaties with Indians § 54 (2010).
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convert the Native Americans to Christianity and eventually in-
tegrate them into European-American communities. "With jus-
tice, personal rights, and the protection of law, the Gospel will
do for our Red brothers what it has done for the other races-
give to them homes, manhood and freedom." 198 Government
officials viewed conversion to Christianity as indispensible to
"civilizing" the Native Americans.199 This project was initially
called the "Peace Plan," 200 and these efforts continued for
roughly eighty years.
Over the lifespan of the Peace Plan the federal government
(1) placed Native American reservations under the supervision
and control of Christian overseers, 201 (2) required Christian pa-
rochial schooling,202 and (3) outlawed various Native American
cultural and religious ceremonies.203 Throughout the duration
of these policies the government compiled annual reports statis-
tically tracking assimilative characteristics of Native-American
communities.204 Each of these policies was designed to further
assimilation; they worked.
1. Peace Plan Wardship by Christians
Congress appointed a committee to investigate the relation-
ship between government agents and Native Americans.205 In
1867 that committee's report noted widespread abuses in the im-
plementation of federal policies and recommended that an over-
sight system, in part manned by religious groups, be
198 Dussais, supra note 170, at 776 (quoting H.B. Whipple, Preface to HELEN
JACKSON, A CENTURY OF DISHONOR: A SKETCH OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT'S DEALINGS WITH SOME OF THE INDIAN TRIBES, at xxiv (Uni-
versity of Okla. Press 1995)).
199 Dussias, supra note 170, at 781.
200 Id. at 777-78.
201 See infra notes 205-23 and accompanying text.
202 See infra notes 224-30 and accompanying text.
203 See infra notes 230-48 and accompanying text.
204 Dussias, supra note 170, at 780 (quoting BD. OF INDIAN COMM'Rs AF-
FAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT 60-74 (1873).
205 Id. at 777-78.
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implemented.206 At first the federal government mostly used
Quakers, but after 1870 it used many different Christian sects to
convert the Native Americans and educate them in western tra-
ditions.207 The federal government and the Christian missiona-
ries both wanted to assimilate Native Americans into western
society by discouraging their cultural and religious practices.208
In 1868, the Peace Commission, another Congressional commit-
tee, reported that the United States' policy towards the Native
Americans had been "uniformly unjust." 209
The legal status of the uncivilized Indians should
be that of wards of the government; the duty of
the latter being to protect them, to educate them
in industry, the arts of civilization, and the princi-
ples of Christianity . . . . The establishment of
Christian missions should be encouraged, and
their schools fostered. . . . the religion of our
blessed Saviour is believed to be the most effec-
tive agent for the civilization of any people.210
In President Grant's 1869 inaugural address, he declared his
intent to pursue "any course . .. which tends to [Indian] civiliza-
tion and ultimate citizenship." 211 Grant's administration hoped
to use government funds and Christian organizations to estab-
lish churches and parochial schools on Native American reser-
vations to further the ultimate goal of assimilating the tribal
communities.212 To effect this mission, Grant established the
"[B]oard of Indian Commissioners and the allotment of Indian
agencies to religious groups." 2 13 Between 1869 and 1882, the
federal government directly funded (mostly Protestant) Chris-
206 Id. at 778.
207 Id. at 781.
208 Id. at 775.
209 See Dussias, supra note 170, at 778 n.23 (quoting H. EXEC. Doc. No. 40-
97, at 15-17 (1898).
210 Id. at 773 (quoting BD. OF INDIAN COMM'RS, ANNUAL REPORT 10
(1869)).
211 Id. at 778.
212 See id. at 779.
213 Id. at 779.
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tian missionaries working on Native American reservations as
government agents. 214 After a preliminary inquiry, the Board
happily reported that "the Indian, as a race, can be induced to
work, is susceptible of civilization, and presents a most inviting
field for the introduction of Christianity."215
Public support for the Peace Policy declined in the wake of
violent clashes sparked by forced tribal relocations implemented
between 1876 and 1882.216 Oklahoma, the target of many of
these relocations, has the largest Native American population;
Arizona follows in distant second place. 217 In 1877, President
Hayes succeeded Grant in office and refocused away from
Christianization and towards promoting property ownership;
federal focus shifted back and forth during the next several ad-
ministrations.218 In 1887, Congress enacted the Indian Land Al-
lotment Act which, in addition to allocating real property rights
to tribe-members and granting citizenship rights, allocated land
to "any religious society or other organization ... for religious
or educational work among the Indians."219
The Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs' 220 statis-
tics indicate that the number of churches on reservations had
more than tripled between 1890 and 1920.221 The number of
Catholics and Protestants also increased substantially just over
the ten years between 1910 and 1920.222 These religious statis-
tics were recorded with as much detail as statistics about crimi-
214 Id. at 774, 777.
215 Dussias, supra note 170, at 780 (quoting BD. OF INDIAN COMM'RS. AN-
NUAL REPORT 9 (1869)).
216 Id. at 780.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 782-83.
219 The Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 390 (1887). The act also condi-
tioned the citizenship grant on, among other things, having "adopted the hab-
its of civilized life." Id.
220 The Board of Indian Commissioners continued to exist through 1934 but
it ceased to have any official responsibilities in 1882. Dussias, supra note 170,
at 783.
221 Id.
222 Id.
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nal activities, literacy, and marriages-interracial and
intraracial.223
2. Mandatory Christian Education
During the Peace Policy, the government awarded contracts
to religious organizations to run schools for tribes.224 Educa-
tional policies were seen as indispensible to the goal of assimi-
lating the Native Americans: "[E]ducation 'cuts the cord that
binds [Indians] to a Pagan life, places the Bible in their hands,
and substitutes the true God for the false one, Christianity in
place of idolatry.. . cleanliness in place of filth, industry in place
of idleness.'"225 Conflicts between this policy and the Establish-
ment clause were not even considered until 1892, when Protes-
tants started attacking the use of Catholic, rather than
Protestant, sects in government-funded tribal schools. 2 2 6
Even after the Peace Policy ended, parochial schools contin-
ued to play an important role in the federal government's pres-
ence on Indian lands. 2 2 7 When, after 1897, the government
stopped funding sectarian schools, it replaced them with govern-
ment-run schools. 2 2 8 The government-run schools required the
observance and practice of nondenominational Christianity by
students, and while Catholics complained that "nondenomina-
tional" meant Protestant, no one seemed to complain that the
Native Americans were not allowed to keep their own relig-
ion.2 2 9 Federal regulations from as late as the 1920's required
church and Sunday school attendance by all Indian students at
government boarding schools.230
223 Id.
224 Dussias, supra note 170, at 784.
225 Id. at 783 (quoting SUPERINTENDENT OF INDIAN EDUC. ANNUAL RE-
PORT 131 (1887)).
226 Id. at 784.
227 Id. at 783.
228 Id. at 785.
229 Id. at 786-87.
230 Id. at 802-03.
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3. Native American Cultural Ceremonies Outlawed
Around the same time that it was forcibly relocating many
Native Americans between 1876 and 1882, shortly before the
Allotment Act, the government was concentrating its assimila-
tion efforts on suppressing ceremonial dances.231 Secretary of
the Interior Henry Teller proclaimed, "if it is the purpose of the
Government to civilize the Indians, they must be compelled to
desist from the savage and barbarous practices that are calcu-
lated to continue them in savagery, no matter what exterior in-
fluences are brought to bear on them." 232 When the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs defined "Indian Offenses" in
1883, the outlawed acts included participating in native cultural
dances, practicing as a medicine man, and distributing or de-
stroying property; each act played a role in Native American
religious practices.233
The prohibition was not enforced equally against all dances;
the most feared dances were seen as particularly sacrilegious be-
cause of their sexual overtones. 234 A Protestant organization
described these dances:
[T]he great evils in the way of their ultimate civili-
zation lie in these dances. The dark superstitions
and unhallowed rites of a heathenism as gross as
that of India or Central Africa still infects them
with its insidious poison, which, unless replaced by
Christian civilization, must sap their very life
blood.235
Pueblo dances, for example, were targeted by government offi-
cials specifically because of their erotic expression. 236 The Hopi
Snake dance shocked Protestant missionaries so much that the
231 Id. at 788.
232 Dussias, supra note 170, at 788 (quoting SEC'Y OF THE INTERIOR, AN-
NUAL REPORT X (1883) (referring to Native American religions)).
233 Id. at 788-89.
234 See id. at 790-91.
235 COMM. OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1882).
236 Dussias, supra note 170, at 800.
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official report was kept out of public circulation in a file dubbed
"Secret Dance File" because it described "the most depraved
and immoral practices."237 When Alfred Kroeber asked for a
copy of the file, the Protestant organization in possession of it
declared that it was too obscene to be transported via the
United States Postal Service.238 Pueblos who were eventually
able to read the "Secret Dance File" contended that it was en-
tirely false, even libelous.239
Government agents persuaded Native Americans to give up
their ceremonial dances by threatening to withhold food rations,
doling out punishments, or even using force.240 One of the main
targets was the Lakota Sioux's Ghost Dance.241 The Ghost
Dance was a relatively new practice that incorporated teachings
similar to the Ten Commandments into a tribal dance that ap-
parently looked pagan and frightening to uneducated European
observers. 242 In an attempt to suppress the Ghost Dance, the
federal government sent troops to Sioux lands in 1890.243 The
United States Army, in an attempt to arrest Ghost Dance lead-
ers, killed the Sioux Chief, Sitting Bull. 2 4 4 The Army's attempt
to suppress the dances culminated in the massacre of around 300
Sioux men, women, and children near Wounded Knee Creek on
the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota.245 This accom-
plished the federal government's mission of suppressing the
Ghost Dance.246
By 1921 the Bureau of Indian Affairs reported that Native
American ceremonial dances were on the decline. 247 When the
federal government in the 1920's finally relented and allowed
237 Id. at 801.
238 Id. at 801-02.
239 Id. at 804.
240 Id. at 791.
241 See id. at 794-96.
242 See id.
243 Id. at 797.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 797-98.
246 Id. at 799.
247 Id. at 802.
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ceremonial dances, it imposed severe restrictions, such as only
allowing tribe members over fifty to be present.248
C. Attempts to Protect and Reclaim Religious Practices
through Litigation
Recently, Native American individuals and tribes have at-
tempted to use the Constitutions' religious freedom guarantees
to protect the cultural traditions that they have been able to
maintain in spite of the government's Christianization and as-
similation policies. Their attempts, however, have not been very
successful. Since the Johnson decision, federal courts have ad-
dressed numerous cases in which Native Americans' freedom of
religion came into conflict with property rights, and property
rights always won.2 4 9 These cases arose when Native Americans
attempted to block construction, development, or mining on
lands that the tribe no longer held title to but had historically
been sacred to their people.250 The federal courts made it suc-
cessively more difficult for tribes to enjoin such land uses based
on their religious practices. 251
In some cases, the federal courts warned that granting the
tribes' claims with respect to public lands would effectively es-
tablish "religious shrine[s]" and run afoul of the Establishment
Clause.252 Remember that the Establishment Clause did not
248 Id. at 803.
249 See generally id. at 825-34.
250 See generally Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439 (1988); United States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 910 (1989); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
cert denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Authority, 620
F.2d 1159, (6th Cir. 1980); Havasupai Tribe v. Robertson, 943 F.2d 32 (9th
Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471
(D. Ariz. 1990), aff'd sub nom; Manybeads v. United States, 730 F. Supp.
1515 (D. Ariz. 1989); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D 1982), affd,
706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). See also Dussias, supra note 170,
at 825-34.
251 See supra notes 249-250 and accompanying text.
252 Bandoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980). See generally
Wilson, 708 F.2d at 747; Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope v. United
States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982), aff'd, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984)
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protect Native Americans from federally-funded parochial
schools in their territories, or federal regulations mandating
Sunday school attendance, both of which were imposed on them
in the 1800's through the early 1900's.253
In one case, the Supreme Court explained that allowing the
Native Americans' religious-based property ownership claim
would "easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some
rather spacious tracts of public property."254 This seems like a
particularly hypocritical fear for the Supreme Court to express,
given that those "rather spacious tracts" became "public prop-
erty" by operation of the Supreme Court's dubious Johnson
jurisprudence.255
Free Exercise jurisprudence also failed to protect Native
Americans' educational interests. After the federal government
pulled funding for officially sectarian schools, the Catholic
Church continued to operate its missionary functions on reser-
vations, and planned to use treaty funds and land cessation
funds to finance these operations.256 When Native Americans
tried to keep the Catholic Church from appropriating these tri-
bal funds, the Supreme Court denied their request, stating: "It
may fairly be said that leaving accommodation [of religious
practices] to the political process will place at a relative disad-
vantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in;
but that [is an] unavoidable consequence of democratic govern-
ment . . . ."257 After Native Americans lost their land to the
judicial process and had their religious and cultural practices at-
tacked through the political process, the modern judiciary told
(per curiam); United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247 (D.S.D. 1985), rev'd
858 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1988); Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 791; Dussias, supra note
170, at 847-50.
253 See Dussias, supra note 170, at 786-87. See also supra Part II.B.2.
254 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453.
255 See id.; see generally Johnson, 21 U.S. at 543; see also Dussias, supra note
170, at 833.
256 Dussias, supra note 170, at 785.
257 Id. at 805 (quoting Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 890 (1990)).
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them they would have to resort to the political process to pro-
tect what was left of their religious heritage.
In Quick Bear v. Leupp, the Supreme Court addressed the
free exercise of Native American religion by upholding the Bu-
reau of Catholic Indian Missions' right to use Rosebud Sioux
funds to support its sectarian schools. 2 5 8 "[I]t seems inconceiv-
able that Congress should have intended to prohibit [Indians]
from receiving religious education at their own cost if they so
desire it; such an intent would be one to prohibit the free exer-
cise of religion amongst the Indians." 259 The Quick Bear deci-
sion enforced the right to practice Catholicism rather than
Protestantism but not the right to practice a traditional Native
American religion.260
Native Americans' religious-freedom lawsuits have frequently
run into trouble overcoming the courts' threshold inquiry: is the
practice religious or merely cultural in nature? 261 The practices
that Native Americans seek to protect have repeatedly been
deemed merely cultural.262 The exclusion of Native American
cultural practices seems contrary to the Supreme Court's deter-
mination in Wisconsin v. Yoder that the Amish lifestyle could be
protected as religious practice if it was "inseparable and interde-
pendent" with their religious beliefs.263
To summarize this cursory overview of Native American juris-
prudence is a practice in ironic dissonance. Native Americans'
cultural practices, including their dances, were once outlawed
because they were seen as antithetical to their Christianization
and eventual assimilation into western culture, but now Native
Americans' cultural practices do not get constitutional protec-
tion because they are merely cultural. Native Americans were
unable to prohibit the use of tribal funds to support Catholic
258 Dussias, supra note 170, at 785-86.
259 Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 82 (1908).
260 Dussias, supra note 170, at 786.
261 See id. at 806-09.
262 See id.
263 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-207 (1972); see also Dussias, supra
note 170, at 809.
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schools, and they were unable to choose secular schools or ones
that taught their own religious beliefs. Native Americans lost
their lands due to the discovery doctrine, and now they cannot
protect their ancestral homelands because to do so would give
them de facto ownership of what are now federal lands.
IV. CONCLUSION
Native Americans' many attempts to reclaim their culture and
religion through judicial and legislative processes have been en-
tirely unsuccessful. Given this history, it is not surprising that
tribal leaders reacted to the marriage of Reynolds and McKinley
as though their culture was under attack, even though a same-
sex marriage is entirely consistent with Native American tradi-
tions. Reynolds and McKinley have always maintained that
their marriage was never supposed to be an activist gesture; they
got married because McKinley was not allowed to visit Reyn-
olds when she had been hospitalized in 2003.264
The current cultural conditions and tribe members' impres-
sions of their own cultural heritage are at odds with anthropo-
logical accounts of North America's historical cultures. The
United States' legal system has outlawed or belittled facets of
tribal culture that anthropologists identify as crucial to the Na-
tive Americans' gender systems. The result is that a cultural
space, where same-sex couples and gender non-conformity once
would have been welcomed, is hostile towards a couple that
does not fit the traditional Christian gender norm.
This transformation of tribal values might not have happened
absent the interference of Judeo-Christian lawmakers. Federal
and state laws targeted important aspects of Native American
culture, a culture based on a gender system that accepted non-
conformity more readily than Western societies.
Productive work was important to the Native American gen-
der system, but federal and state laws stripped away property
rights and forced tribal communities to adopt European eco-
264 Kurt, supra note 9, at 14A.
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nomic systems. Traditional attire was important as well, but
United States laws encouraged or required western-style dress
in parochial schools. The Alyha and Hwame traditions were
rooted in Native American religious teachings, and the govern-
ment spent eighty years officially Christianizing the Native
American population. The federal government even outlawed
specific ceremonies that diverged too greatly from Christian val-
ues. The Alyha and Hwame identities were celebrated and con-
firmed through such ceremonies.
At the very least, the legal system did not protect the Native
American tribes' perspective on gender, marriage, and same-sex
relationships. More likely, the judiciary's systematic rejection of
Native American rights, coupled with the legislative and execu-
tive branches' zealous pursuit of tribal Christianization and as-
similation, contributed to the radical transformation of tribal
values.
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